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Abstract
Dictyostelium discoideum is a eukaryotic amoeba which, when starvation is im-
minent, aggregates to form fruiting bodies consisting of a stalk of reproductively
dead cells that supports spores. Since different clones may be involved in such
aggregations, cheater strategies may emerge that allocate a smaller fraction of
cells to stalk formation, thus gaining a reproductive advantage. In this paper we
model the evolutionary dynamics of allocation strategies in Dictyostelium un-
der the realistic assumption that the number of clones involved in aggregations
follows a random distribution. By determining the full course of evolutionary dy-
namics, we show that evolutionary branching in allocation strategies may occur,
resulting in dimorphic populations that produce stalkless and stalked fruiting
bodies. We also demonstrate that such dimorphisms are more likely to emerge
when the variation in the number of clones involved in aggregations is large.
1. Introduction
Altruism is a cooperative behaviour that increases the fitness of others at a cost to the
individual. While such behaviour may seem evolutionarily paradoxical at first sight,
its existence has been documented in many cases spanning several taxonomic groups
(Crespi, 1996; Galliard et al., 2003). Three types of mechanisms have been suggested to
explain the prevalence of altruistic behaviour in nature. First, kin selection (Hamilton,
1963, 1964, 1972) has been successful in explaining altruistic behaviour among lower
animals, with a wealth of supporting evidence having been accumulated over the past
few decades. For kin-selection to act efficiently, individuals must be closely related, as
is often the case for social insects such as ants or bees. A second mechanism for the
evolution of altruistic behaviour is group selection (Wilson & Dugatkin, 1997), which
acts by differentially affecting the survival of subpopulations in structured populations.
Group selection has been used, for example, to demonstrate the existence of an upper
bound for the evolution of virulence in spatially structured pathogen-host models
(van Baalen & Rand, 1998). Third, also direct or indirect reciprocation may lead to
1
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altruistic behaviour (Axelrod, 1984; Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Trivers, 1971). Since
reciprocation relies on memorizing past behaviour it is thought to apply mainly to
cooperation among higher animals.
Dictyostelium discoideum is a eukaryotic amoeba which, when starvation is immi-
nent, aggregates to form fruiting bodies where a stalk supports a spherical structure
containing spores called a sorus (Fortunato et al., 2003b; Raper, 1984). Cells par-
ticipating in the formation of the stalk exhibit an extreme form of altruism; they
die in the process, without any chance of participating in reproduction. Only cells
in the sorus form spores, which are subsequently distributed through passive disper-
sal. Dictyostelium is interesting from an evolutionary viewpoint since it readily forms
so-called chimeric aggregations, in which different clones mix in the process of stalk
formation and spore dispersal. These chimeric aggregations have been observed in the
laboratory, and are assumed also to occur under natural conditions (Fortunato et al.,
2003b). In chimeric aggregations, there is the potential for the emergence of cheater
strategies that allocate less to stalk formation and thus gain a reproductive advantage
in spore dispersal. Indeed, several such cheating strains have been documented (Buss,
1982; Dao et al., 2000; Strassmann et al., 2000). The conceptually simplest form of
cheating amounts to clones that allocate only a small fixed proportion of all cells to
the jointly formed stalk. Most of the documented cheater clones, however, are able
to sense whether or not they are participating in a chimeric aggregation and decrease
their allocation to stalk formation only in the presence of other clones they can thus
exploit. Some clones are even able to parasitize other clones in ways that cannot be
explained by stalk-to-spore allocation ratios alone (Fortunato et al., 2003b; Kessin,
2001).
Explaining how altruism can persist in the presence of cheaters is a challenging
and important task in evolutionary ecology. It is therefore surprising that, so far,
only a handful of theoretical studies have analyzed the evolutionary dynamics of
Dictyostelium. These studies have almost exclusively concentrated on fixed-allocation
cheating, and it indeed seems natural to understand this case before considering more
complex interactions. In an influential study, Armstrong (1984) investigated a model
consisting of altruists, cheaters and loners (amoebas that do not aggregate). In this
model, amoebas were situated on a lattice and performed random walks with division
until a critical total population size was reached and aggregation occurred. Depending
on the parameters used, this led to varying degrees of clustering among clones. Based
on these results, Armstrong concluded that altruistic behaviour can indeed persist
even in the presence of cheaters. Matapurkar & Watve (1997) later considered an ex-
tended model in which cyclic population dynamics could occur. A different path was
taken by Matsuda & Harada (1990) who identified evolutionarily stable stalk-to-spore
allocation ratios in aggregations formed by a given number of spores with a given dis-
tribution of these ratios. In this manner, some far-reaching insights could be derived
analytically. Hudson et al. (2002) analyzed a special case of this latter model, and also
presented one of the first models of variable-allocation cheating.
The studies by Armstrong (1984); Matapurkar & Watve (1997); Matsuda & Harada
(1990) and Hudson et al. (2002) significantly advanced understanding of how altruistic
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behaviour in Dictyostelium could have evolved, despite its apparent vulnerability to
cheating. While Armstrong (1984) and Matapurkar & Watve (1997) relied mainly on
on numerical simulations, Matsuda & Harada (1990) and Hudson et al. (2002) only
considered evolutionarily stable strategies in chimeric aggregations with fixed sets of
founder spores. In this paper we combine the strengths of these previous approaches
by allowing for a probabilistic variable number of founder spores, while retaining ana-
lytic tractability to a large extent. Evolutionary dynamics in the extended model are
analyzed based on adaptive dynamics theory (Dieckmann & Law, 1996; Geritz et al.,
1998; Metz et al., 1996).
2. Model description
We study a model in which, in each generation, fruiting bodies are formed at a large
(infinite) number of sites. At the beginning of a generation, spores are randomly dis-
persed among sites, where they turn into amoebas. At each site, these amoebas may
then aggregate into a stalk and a sorus, producing new spores. Amoebas differ in their
probability α of participating in the formation of stalks. This trait is allowed to evolve.
2.1. Dispersed spores
We first determine the number of spores successfully dispersed from a fruiting body
when the number and traits of the founder spores, from which that fruiting body is
formed, are given. This component of the model closely follows Hudson et al. (2002).
We consider a fruiting body that is founded by a total of k = k1 + . . . + kn spores,
with trait values α1, . . . , αn respectively. The weighted arithmetic mean
αg = (k1α1 + . . .+ knαk)/k
is the expected fraction of amoebas participating in the formation of the stalk. As-
suming that the number of amoebas in a fruiting body is constant and large, we take
αg as a measure of the stalk’s quality as it may, for example, be quantified in terms
of stalk height. The fraction of spores successfully dispersed from a stalk of quality αg
is D(αg), and this fraction is equal for all clones participating in the corresponding
fruiting body. The total number of successfully dispersed spores with trait value αi is
then given by
D(αg)(1− αi)bki/k.
Here, 1−αi is the fraction of amoebas with trait value αi that participate in the fruiting
body (rather than in stalk formation), and ki/k is the fraction of amoebas with trait
value αi at the considered site. Thus, the product (1−αi)ki/k is the fraction of amoebas
in the fruiting body producing spores with trait value αi. Finally we multiply with a
constant b to convert this fraction into the number of dispersed spores. This constant
determines the product of the number of amoebas in the fruiting body and the number
of spores a single amoeba can produce.
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2.2. Founded aggregations
The fraction of all founder spores belonging to a given clone is deterministic, and
is given by the clone’s proportion among the spores successfully dispersed at the
beginning of a generation. By contrast, the number of founder spores arriving at a
particular site is random. Sites that do not receive any spores cannot produce fruiting
bodies and therefore do not contribute to the generation of new spores. To describe
the randomness in the number of founder spores, we can thus restrict attention to
the probability distribution {pk}
∞
k=1 of these numbers at sites that receive at least one
spore.
We now consider the densities a1, . . . an of spores with trait values α1, . . . , αn suc-
cessfully dispersed at the beginning of a generation. From these densities we can derive
the densities of spores successfully dispersed at the beginning of the next generation,
denoted by a′1, . . . , a
′
n. The density a
′
j of spores with trait value αj in the next gener-
ation is given by summing over all possible configurations of founder spores that may
arise at sites. This sum over founder configurations can be broken up into a first sum
over the total number of founder spores and a second sum over the numbers by which
the different clones contribute to this total number of spores,
a′j =
∞∑
k=1
pk
∑
k1+...+kn=k
P(k1 . . . kn|k1 + . . . + kn = k)D(αg)b(1− αj)
kj
k
. (1)
Since the number of fruiting bodies is assumed to be large (infinite), pk describes
the fraction of sites at which a total of k spores arrive. Given this total number k
of founder spores, P(k1 . . . kn|k1 + . . . + kn = k) denotes the conditional probability
of k1, . . . , kn of these founder spores having trait values α1, . . . , αn. Accordingly, the
product pkP(k1 . . . kn|k1 + . . .+ kn = k) describes the joint probability with which the
founder configuration k1, . . . , kn occurs. Since we are assuming that the trait values of
founder spores are drawn randomly in proportion to the densities that the correspond-
ing clones have among successfully dispersed spores, this joint probability follows a
multinomial distribution,
P(k1 of trait α1, ..., kn of trait αn) =
k!
k1! . . . kn!
ak1
1
. . . aknn
(a1 + . . .+ an)k
.
When only two clones are present (a1 = ar, a2 = am, α1 = r and α2 = m), Equation
1 simplifies to
a′m =
∞∑
k=1
pk
k∑
i=1
(
k
i
)(
am
am + ar
)i( ar
am + ar
)k−i
D
(
im+ (k − i)r
k
)
ib(1−m)
k
. (2)
Equations 1 and 2 describe how the densities of successfully dispersed spores change
over successive generations. The equations show that, to complete the description
of our model, two aspects still have to be quantified: first, we have to specify the
dispersal benefit of stalk quality (described by the function D), and second, we have
to consider the probability distribution of the number of founder spores (described by
the probabilities pk).
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2.3. The benefit of stalk quality
Unlike many spore-producing plants and fungi, spores produced by Dictyostelium are
not dispersed by wind but by animals, or, in some cases, by rain water washing through
the soil (Bonner, 1982). Especially birds and insects feeding on the fruiting bodies pro-
vide an effective means of long-range dispersal (Suthers, 1985), while passing micro-
arthropods or annelids pick up spores and disperse them over shorter distances (Huss,
1989). The spores may also be consumed by nematodes, a natural predator of Dic-
tyostelium, and thereby be dispersed over short distances up to about 5 centimeters
(Kessin, 2001). It is assumed that stalk quality is important in all of these cases, even
though it may play less of a role in dispersal through nematodes or water. Yet, no
attempts to measure the dependence of spore dispersal on stalk height seem to have
been made. Two qualitative observations nevertheless appear to be warranted. First,
the spatial autocorrelation of environmental conditions over short distances favor long-
and medium-range dispersal. Since the known mechanisms by which such dispersal is
achieved seem to require a stalk, dispersal success must be expected to increase with
stalk height, at least at small heights. Second, since dispersal by birds and insects
likely requires a certain critical stalk height, a strong increase in dispersal success is
expected at certain heights. As no mechanistic derivation is feasible, we will consider
flexible functions to describe the dependence of dispersal success D(αg) on stalk qual-
ity αg. One such function was introduced by Hudson et al. (2002), who assumed that
dispersal success was given by
D(r) = d0 + (1− d0)r
q. (3)
The parameter d0 allows for some baseline dispersal success for spores originating from
stalkless fruiting bodies, while the parameter q determines the shape of D, which is
convex for q ≥ 1 and concave for q ≤ 1. This particular choice of function implies
that the slope of D at r = 0 is either zero (if D is convex) or infinite (if D is con-
cave). By contrast, the two qualitative observations described above suggest functions
that combine a positive initial slope (first observation) with a convex shape (second
observation). We will therefore consider an alternative, more flexible function,
D(r) =
(
r + ǫ
1 + ǫ
)q
. (4)
Examples of the shapes of this function are shown in Figure 1 for several values of q
and ǫ. As we can see, this function allows for a positive initial slope combined with
a convex shape. As long as ǫ > 0, spores originating from stalkless fruiting bodies
experience a non-vanishing dispersal success. Since the selection pressures acting on
the dispersal efficiency of fruiting bodies are probably enormous in small organisms
(Bonner, 1982), these properties seem reasonable.
2.4. The distribution of founder spores
To complete the description of our model it is necessary to specify the probability
distribution for the number of founder spores. Unfortunately, few empirical studies
Bra¨nnstro¨m and Dieckmann: Evolutionary dynamics of social amoebas 6
have addressed this question. An exception is the work by Fortunato et al. (2003a),
who analyzed 50 soil samples collected near the Mountain Lake Biological Station in
Virginia, USA: 26 of these samples contained more than one isolate of Dictyostelium.
The distribution determined by the number of isolates in these 26 samples is shown
in Figure 2b. Although there are many plausible ways to specify the distribution of
founder spores, we will see that the precise form of this distribution is not important:
most of our conclusions below only depend on two statistical features of the considered
distribution: the expectation µ and standard deviation σ of the inverse founder spore
numbers at sites that receive at least one spore,
µ =
∞∑
k=1
pk
k
and σ2 =
∞∑
k=1
pk
(
µ−
1
k
)2
.
If µ is close to one, each fruiting body results from only one or a few spores and
thus contains only one or a few clones. Under such conditions, we expect kin selection
to be a strong force driving the evolutionary dynamics towards altruistic behaviour.
Conversely, for low values of µ such behaviour is not expected to evolve to any large
degree. However, if a low value of µ is combined with a relatively large value of σ, which
implies a large standard deviation of founder spore number per site, a significant
proportion of sites will still receive only few founder spores and kin selection may
be strong. A convenient statistics that roughly captures this joint dependence is the
coefficient of variation, σ/µ, obtained by expressing the standard deviation σ in units of
the mean µ. Kin selection may be strong when this coefficient of variation is sufficiently
large.
3. Evolutionary invasibility analysis
We now proceed with investigating the model’s evolutionary dynamics. At the heart
of this analysis lies the question of whether or not a mutant clone may successfully
invade the population of an established resident clone. This question can be addressed
by considering the reproductive ratio of a rare mutant clone with trait value m in the
environment determined by a resident clone with trait value r,
Sr(m) = lim
am→0+
a′m(a
∗
r , am)
am
.
Since the resident clone is assumed to be at equilibrium, Sr(r) = 1 always holds. The
mutant can invade the resident whenever Sr(m) > 1. As long as mutant and resident
trait values are similar, such an invasion generically implies a trait substitution, during
which the mutant replaces the resident (Geritz et al., 2002). In adaptive dynamics
theory, the function Sr(m) is known as invasion fitness (Metz et al., 1992). We can use
the so-called selection gradient S′r(r) to determine when a mutant with a trait value
m similar to r can invade: m > r can invade if S′r(m) > 0, and m < r can invade if
S′r(m) < 0. In the Appendix we show that the selection gradient of our model is given
by
S′r(r) = µ
D′(r)
D(r)
−
1
1− r
.
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Based on the analysis of invasion fitness and selection gradient, we will show below
that, under certain conditions, the evolutionary dynamics of altruism in our model
passes through a sequence of four distinct phases. In the course of this evolutionary
process the population of amoebas first changes from stalkless clones to stalked clones,
and then to an evolutionarily stable dimorphism of stalkless and stalked clones.
3.1. Incipient altruism
When can stalked clones, r > 0, evolve from stalkless ones, r = 0, through a sequence
of small evolutionary steps? The selection gradient in Equation 5 shows that this
is possible if µD′(0) > D(0). The dispersal success function considered by Hudson
et al. (2002), Equation 3, yields µD′(0) < D(0) whenever q > 1. By contrast, the
alternative function in Equation 4 yields µD′(0) > D(0) whenever µq > 0: under
this condition clones with stalked fruiting bodies can thus evolve from stalkless ones.
These conclusions are underscored by the geometric illustrations in Figure 3, which, by
means of so-called pairwise invasibility plots (Geritz et al., 1998) show combinations of
mutant and resident trait values for which the mutant can invade the resident. Figure
3a shows that, based on Equation 3, no mutants exist that can invade a resident with
trait value r = 0. Figure 3b shows that this situation is exactly reserved when dispersal
success follows Equation 4. In the following we will investigate the further course of
evolution based on Equation 4.
3.2. Mounting altruism
Once stalked clones have evolved from stalkless ones, where will the evolutionary trend
towards increasing levels of altruism end? To answer this question, we have to identify
trait values at which directional selection ceases and the selection gradient vanishes.
Such points are called evolutionarily singular (Metz et al., 1996). When such points
serve as attractors of gradual evolutionary change in their neighborhood, they are
called convergence stable (Christiansen, 1991; Eshel, 1983; Eshel & Motro, 1981). With
dispersal success given by Equation 4, a unique convergence stable singular strategy
exists at
r∗ =
µq − ǫ
1 + µq
. (6)
As shown in the Appendix, this strategy falls in the range 0 < r∗ < 1 whenever the
evolution of incipient altruism is possible, q > 0 and 0 < ǫ < µq.
3.3. Evolutionary branching
Once gradual evolution has reached r∗, what will happen next? The answer depends
on whether selection at this point is stabilizing, such that evolution comes to a halt,
or disruptive, such that evolution may continue further. In the first case the evolu-
tionarily singular strategy is situated at a fitness maximum and is said to be locally
evolutionarily stable (Maynard-Smith & Price, 1973). By contrast, disruptive selection
at a convergence stable singular strategy occurs at a fitness minimum and is expected
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to initiate a process known as evolutionary branching (Geritz et al., 1998; Metz et al.,
1996). During such a process a protected dimorphism of clones may evolve. We now
show that, under certain conditions, evolutionary branching may occur in our model.
When the second derivative of invasion fitness at r∗, given by
S′′r (r
∗) =
(
1 + µq
1 + ǫ
)2((σ2
µ2
+ 1
)
q − 1
q
− 2
)
(7)
is positive, selection at r∗ is disruptive and evolutionary branching is possible. This
implies that evolutionary branching may occur only if the coefficient of variation of
the inverse number of founder spores is sufficiently large,
σ
µ
>
√
1 +
2
q − 1
.
In Figure 2a, the largest possible region in which this condition applies is highlighted
in black. Since the inverse founder spore numbers at sites that receive at least one
spore are positive and never exceed one, we have σ <
√
µ(1− µ). In Figure 2a, the
region in which this consistency condition does not hold is shown in gray. In summary,
evolutionary branching at r∗ occurs in the black region of Figure 2a, whereas evolution
comes to a halt at r∗ in the white region of Figure 2a.
Notice that combining the two inequalities above implies µ > 1/2. This means that
for evolutionary branching to occur there must on average be more than 2 founder
spores at sites receiving at least one spore. In addition, the coefficient of variation has
to be sufficiently high for kin selection to act efficiently. Not many distributions satisfy
this criteria. For example, the empirically determined distribution (Figure 2b) does
not. Alternatively, when we assume that the numbers of founder spores are distributed
geometrically, pk = (1− p)
k−1p with 0 < p < 1, the average number of founder spores
needs to exceed 19.3 if evolutionary branching is to occur for q = 3. This threshold
decreases to 13.2 for q = 5, to 10.2 for q = 10, and to 7.96 as q tends to infinity.
3.4. Dimorphic evolution
Once evolutionary branching has been initiated at r∗, what is the further course of
dimorphic evolution? To prepare for addressing this question, we first consider all
combinations of trait values r1 and r2 that result in a protected dimorphism. This is
the case if and only if the two corresponding clones can mutually invade, that is, a
rare mutant with trait value r1 can invade a resident population with trait value r2
and vice versa. Based on the pairwise invasibility plot in Figure 3b, we find the region
of coexistence as the largest subset of the range of positive invasion fitness that is
symmetric around the diagonal. This region is shown in gray in Figure 4a; dimorphic
evolution can only occur in its interior. We now study the evolutionary dynamics of a
dimorphic population inside the region of coexistence in much the same way as we did
for a monomorphic population, except that the actual calculations have to be done
numerically rather than analytically. We denote by Sr1,r2(m) the reproductive ratio of
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a rare mutant with trait value m in a dimorphic population with trait values r1 and
r2 that has attained its population dynamical attractor. In principle, this attractor
might imply non-equilibrium dynamics, but–in contrast to the model by Matapurkar
& Watve (1997)–the dimorphic population dynamics of our model always settle on
stable equilibrium densities a∗1 and a
∗
2. The dimorphic invasion fitness
Sr1,r2(m) =
1
a∗
1
+ a∗
2
∞∑
k=1
k−1∑
i=0
(
k − 1
i
)(
a∗1
a∗
1
+ a∗
2
)i( a∗2
a∗
1
+ a∗
2
)k−1−i
×D
(
ir1 + (k − 1− i)r2 +m
k
)
b(1−m)
is obtained analogously to its monomorphic counterpart. If the dimorphic selection
gradient S′r1,r2(m) is positive (negative) at r1 a mutant with a slightly higher (lower)
trait value generically invades and replaces the resident with trait value r1. Figure 4a
shows–for D given by Equation 4, with parameters q = 4 and ǫ = 0.2–the isoclines
at which the selection gradient vanishes for one of the two resident traits. Figure 4a
also highlights the expected directions of gradual dimorphic evolution in the regions
between the isoclines, as determined by the dimorphic selection gradient. In addition,
lines of different thickness are used to indicate whether, on the isoclines, the fitness
Sr1,r2 is at a maximum (thin lines) or minimum (thick lines). Inspection of Figure
4a shows that after evolutionary branching occurs at r1 = r2 ≈ 0.2 the dimorphic
population will evolve towards (0.47, 0) (or, equivalently, towards (0, 0.47)), where one
of the convergence stable isoclines meets the boundary of trait space. In other words,
the dimorphic population will evolve towards a cheater that does not invest in stalk
formation and an altruist that invests in stalk formation. The population dynamics in
Equation 1 show that, for the indicated parameter values, the proportion of cheaters
in the dimorphic population will be around 1/3. Since the boundary equilibrium thus
attained is situated on an isocline that is both convergence stable and locally evo-
lutionarily stable, this dimorphism is recognized as the eventual outcome of gradual
evolution in our model.
3.5. Four phases
To corroborate the conclusions derived above, we simulated the full course of evolu-
tionary dynamics in our model using 1000 fruiting bodies in each generation and con-
sidering normally distributed mutations with mean 0 and standard deviation 5×10−3,
occurring with a probability of 1% per generation. The resultant evolutionary dynam-
ics are shown in Figure 4b. In the simulation, the population was typically polymorphic
(i.e., several traits where often present at the same time); yet, the analysis presented
above held up remarkably well. In particular, all four phases predicted by the pre-
ceding analysis can be observed: incipient altruism (Section 3.1), mounting altruism
(Section 3.2), evolutionary branching (Section 3.3), and dimorphic evolution (Section
3.4), ending up with a population-level mixture of cheaters and altruists.
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4. Discussion
We have analyzed the expected evolutionary dynamics of fixed-allocation clones of
Dictyostelium. In doing so, we have shown how, under specific conditions, evolution-
ary branching may occur, resulting in a mixed population of clones that, when on
their own, produce stalkless and stalked fruiting bodies. When co-occurring on a site,
one of these clones thus exploits the other’s investment into stalk formation, without
contributing any such investment itself. Our results offer insights as to why altruism
persist in Dictyostelium despite the (potential or actual) existence of cheating clones:
depending on conditions, the population of amoebas evolves either to a monomorphic
state of intermediate altruism or to a dimorphic state in which cheaters coexist with
clones exhibiting a high degree of altruism. In this way, our findings also contribute to
understanding the polymorphism of Dictyostelium clones observed in nature. Further-
more, our analysis has, for what is possibly the first time, highlighted the importance
of variability in the number of founder spores for the evolutionary dynamics of Dic-
tyostelium.
We have shown that evolutionary branching occurs under two conditions: first, the
coefficient of variation in the number of founder spores must be sufficiently large, and
second, the function describing the dependence of dispersal success on stalk quality
must be convex. Although these conditions underscore that the scope for evolutionary
branching might be limited, it should be borne in mind that our model ignores many
extra aspects of variation found in nature, for example, by assuming that sites suit-
able for Dictyostelium colonization are identical in all respects. It must be expected
that when other sources of variation are added to the model to enhance its real-
ism, evolutionary branching will occur under more general conditions (as suggested,
for instance, by evolution in the site-based model analyzed by Geritz et al. (1998)).
Furthermore, most clones of Dictyostelium compete more actively among each other
than is captured by the passive fixed-allocation strategies studied here. The additional
frequency-dependent selective pressures resulting from active competition are likely to
broaden the conditions for evolutionary branching.
We can strengthen the case for a convex function describing the dependence of
dispersal success on stalk quality by using Equation 6 to work backwards. Assuming the
empirical distribution reported by Fortunato et al. (2003a) and a stalk-to-spore ratio
of 1/5, commonly observed among naturally occurring Dictyostelium clones (Kessin,
2001), we can conclude that the parameter q must be expected to exceed about 0.8.
If we also assume a positive value of D(0), this brings us well into the convex region.
Nevertheless, any rough and phenomenological description of dispersal success remains
artificial, and corresponding quantitative measurements are therefore highly desirable.
Future work may advance the analysis presented here in two directions. First,
it will be interesting to incorporate explicit spatial structure into the evolutionary
model. This would allow for the differential description of short-range, medium-range,
and long-range dispersal. Most likely, however, the analytical tractability preserved
throughout most of the investigation presented here will be lost in such spatially
explicit evolutionary models. Second, with the dynamics of fixed-investment strate-
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gies now being well-understood, the time may have come to explore the dynamics of
variable-investment strategies in the evolution of Dictyostelium clones. A first step
in this direction has already been taken by Hudson et al. (2002). Equipped with the
insights gained from our and many other studies, these two extensions may now well
be within reach.
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Appendix A
Most of the analysis in this study is based on the reproduction ratio of a rare mutant
with trait value m
Sr(m) = lim
am→0+
a′m(a
∗
r , am)
am
.
Since
lim
am→0+
1
am
P(i of the k founders from am) =
{
k
ar
if i = 1
0 otherwise
Equation 2 implies
lim
am→0+
a′m(a
∗
r , am)
am
=
∞∑
k=1
pk
k
ar
D
(
m+ (k − 1)r
k
)
1−m
k
b
=
1
ar
∞∑
k=1
pkD
(
m+ (k − 1)r
k
)
(1−m)b.
From Sr(r) = 1 we infer an equilibrium resident population density a
∗
r of
a∗r = bD(r)(1− r). (8)
The model’s monomorphic invasion fitness is thus given by
Sr(m) =
∞∑
k=1
pkD
(
m+ (k − 1)r
k
)
1−m
1− r
1
D(r)
. (9)
Differentiation of this invasion fitness with respect to m gives
S′r(m) =
∞∑
k=1
pk
D(r)(1− r)
[
D′
(
m+ (k − 1)r
k
)
1
k
(1−m)−D
(
m+ (k − 1)r
k
)]
.
Evaluating this derivative at m = r yields the monomorphic selection gradient
S′r(r) = µ
D′(r)
D(r)
−
1
1− r
.
Bra¨nnstro¨m and Dieckmann: Evolutionary dynamics of social amoebas 12
Here we have used
µ =
∞∑
k=1
pk
k
which describes the mean of inverse founder spore numbers at sites receiving at least
one spore. The corresponding standard deviation is expressed with the help of
γ =
∞∑
k=1
pk
k2
as
σ =
√
γ − µ2.
The evolutionarily singular strategies, at which the monomorphic selection gradient
vanishes, are found by solving
µD′(r)(1 − r)−D(r) = 0, where r 6= 1 and D(r) 6= 0.
With D(r) given by Equation 4 we obtain a unique evolutionarily singular strategy,
r∗ =
µq − ǫ
1 + µq
.
Since the monomorphic selection gradient is positive for r < r∗ and negative for r > r∗,
r∗ is convergence stable. To determine whether r∗ is also locally evolutionarily stable,
i.e whether it corresponds to a fitness maximum, we differentiate the monomorphic
invasion fitness twice with respect to m,
S′′r (m) =
∞∑
k=1
pk
D(r)(1− r)
[
D′′
(
m+ (k − 1)r
k
)
1
k2
(1−m)− 2D′
(
m+ (k − 1)r
k
)
1
k
]
and evaluate this derivative at m = r,
S′′r (r) = γ
D′′(r)
D(r)
− 2µ
D′(r)
D(r)(1 − r)
.
With D(r) given by Equation 4, this becomes
S′′r (r) =
(
1 + µq
1 + ǫ
)2( γ
µ2
q − 1
q
− 2
)
which is equivalent to Equation 7. When this second derivative is negative, r∗ is
a fitness maximum and thus locally evolutionarily stable; otherwise r∗ is a fitness
minimum.
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Notation Description
α Evolving trait of an amoeba determining its investment into stalk formation.
αg Stalk quality, determined as the weighted arithmetic mean of the trait values of
clones participating in a fruiting body.
r Resident trait. Used instead of α1 when at most two traits are present.
m Mutant trait. Used instead of α2 when two traits are present.
n Number of clones present in the total population
D Function describing the dependence of dispersal success on stalk quality.
b Product of the number of amoebas in a fruiting body, and the number of spores
a single amoeba produces (does not affect any results).
pk Probability that a fruiting body originates from k founder spores, therefore equals
the probability of k founder spores at sites receiving at least one spore.
ai Density of successfully dispersed spores with trait value αi in the current gener-
ation.
a′i Density of successfully dispersed spores with trait value αi in the next generation.
k Total number of founder spores resulting in a fruiting body.
ki Number of founding spores with trait value αi in a fruiting body.
µ, σ Mean and standard deviation of inverse founder spore numbers.
Table 1: Overview of variables and parameters
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Figure 1: Dispersal success as a function of stalk quality according to Equation 4, plotted for all
combinations of q = 1/2, 1, 2, 3 and ǫ = 0.1, 0.4. Curves with the same line style correspond to
identical values of q, with lower curves corresponding to ǫ = 0.1.
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Figure 2: (a) Combinations of the mean µ of inverse founder spore numbers and the corresponding
standard deviation σ for which evolutionary branching is possible (black region) and impossible (white
region). Combinations in the gray region are logically infeasible. The cross in the white region corre-
sponds to the distribution in the right panel. (b) Probability distribution of founder spore numbers
at sites receiving at least one spore according to field measurements by Fortunato et al. (2003a).
Bra¨nnstro¨m and Dieckmann: Evolutionary dynamics of social amoebas 18
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Resident trait
M
ut
an
t t
ra
it
+
+
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Resident trait
M
ut
an
t t
ra
it
+
+
Figure 3: Pairwise invasibility plots for different founder spore distributions and dispersal success
functions. (a) Founder spore distributions according to Figure 2b, and dispersal success function
according to Equation 3 with parameters q = 2 and d0 = 0.05. Note that the evolution of incipient
altruism is precluded. (b) Geometric founder spore distribution with parameter 0.04 and dispersal
success function according to Equation 4 with parameters q = 4 and ǫ = 0.2. Here the evolution of
altruism can take off from r = 0.
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Figure 4: Dimorphic evolutionary dynamics after branching. (a) The region of coexistence, in which
protected dimorphisms are possible, is shown in gray. Arrows indicate the selection gradient’s direction
for each of the two resident trait values. The directions of these selective pressures change at the shown
evolutionary isoclines, defined by vanishing selection gradients. Thin isoclines are evolutionarily stable,
whereas thick isoclines are not. The figure shows that evolutionary change after branching will converge
on an evolutionarily stable dimorphism of a cheater and an altruist, resulting in the trait values
(0.48, 0) at which the evolutionarily stable isocline (thin line) touches the boundary. (b) Simulations
of the polymorphic evolutionary dynamics based on 1000 fruiting bodies, illustrating all four predicted
phases of evolutionary change. In both panels, dispersal success follows Equation 4 with parameters
q = 4 and ǫ = 0.2, and the number of founder spores is distributed geometrically with parameter 0.04,
resulting in an average of 25 founder spores per fruiting body.
